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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABE'TH B. ARCHER,

Plaintiff aud Appellant,
Case No.
vs.

lJT ..\H

~'r.:\T 11:

9990

L:\XD BOARD, et al,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND

~T.A.Tr:~tl~~~T
Thi~

APPELLAN~T

OF THE KIND OF CAS·E

is an action in the nature of mandamus to

co1npel the lTtah State Land Board to issue an oil and
gas lt~ast) to plaintiff and to adjudicate the conflicting
rig-ht~ of plaintiff and defendants.
DI~Pl)SlTIOX

IN LOWER COURT·

On motion of certain designated defendants, the
Court dis1nissed plaintiff's amended complaint with
prejudice.
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2
RELIEF S,OUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower Court's order
dismissing her co1nplaint, with prejudice.
S:TATEl\iENT OF F AC TS
1

On .Jlay 6, 1963, plaintiff filed her co1nplaint
against some 90 defendants, as listed in the caption
thereof. (R. 1-2) The large majority of the defendants
filed answers thereto. However, 1notions to dismiss said
complaint were filed by defendants and respondents,
LTtah State Land Board and the individual members
thereof, and by defendants and respondents, Gulf Oil
Corporation, Southern Natural Gas Company, Sinclair
Oil & Gas Company, J. Murray Ruby, aka James ~1.
Ruby, Ulenna Ruby, Glen M. Ruby, and Helen Ruby. On
July 16, 1963, the Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint
as to the above-named defendants and respondents only.
Pursuant to motion and after having obtained leave
of Court, plaintiff filed her amended co1nplaint on August 5, 1963.
On August 19, the Court granted the above-named
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. Pursuant to plaintiff's motion, the Court, on September 5, 1963, amended its order of August 19, 1963,
and dis1nissed plaintiff's amended complaint as to the
above-na1ned defendants and respondents on the grounds
that said amended complaint fails to state a claim upon
w·hich relief can be granted and on the further grounds
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3
that the Court is \rithout jurisdiction of the subject
rnatter therein contained.
Plaintiff's atnended complaint sets forth four causes
of netion all rl)lating to an application for an oil and
gas lPa~P filed by plaintiff covering all of Section 16,
Township 26 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing (i-10 arrPs, situate in Grand County, State of

Utah.
In hPr first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that a
prior lease issued on the above-mentioned property on
.l unP 5, 1947 for a term of ten years, expired on June
5, 1957, notwithstanding the issuance of a substitute oil
and gas lease on January 2, 1952 purporting to extend
the original lease for an additional ten years from
Jan nary 2, 1952.
Plaintiff alleges that the attempted extension in
1952 by the Utah State Land Board was unauthorized,
in excesse of its powers, ultra vires, unlawful, and
('ontrary to the laws of the State of Utah and the Rules
nnd R.egulations of the Land Board and was, therefore,
a nullity. Plaintiff alleges that on February 26, 196·2, she
filed a properly executed application for an oil and gas
lt\a~P of mineral land with the Utah State Land Board
<'overing the above named property, depositing the required rental, and subject to the usual royalty interest
reserved to the state, and that on March 2, 1962, she filed
a properly executed supplemental application for an oil
and gas lease on the same land.
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Plaintiff alleges that at the time of filing said applications, the above-rnentioned property was not covered
by any valid or existing lease and was open to lease by
plaintiff, and she alleges that she ,,. . as and is a duly
qualified applicant in accordance with the requirements
of the laws of the State of Utah and the Rules and Regulations of the Land Board. Plaintiff alleges in her first
cause of action, as in the other three causes of action,
that the Land Board had continually evidenced its intent
that the land involved be available for leasing to the
public and to duly qualified applicants and that said
land had never been withdrawn from leasing to the public. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant Land
Board is required by the statutes of the State of Utah and
by its own Rules and Regulations to issue an oil and gas
lease to the first qualified applicant. Plaintiff alleges a
demand made upon the Land Board for issuance of the
lease and a refusal by the Land Board, alleging that
such refusal was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory,
unlawful, in excess of its jurisdiction, and a violation of
jts duty as imposed by law.
In her second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that
even if the attempted extension on January 2, 1952 was
effective, that it expired on January 31, 1962 and that
no extensions, by partial assignment or otherwise, have
been effected.
Plaintiff again alleges the filing of her applications,
the fact that she was a duly qualified applicant, that the
land 'vas open to the public for applications for oil and
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ga~ h'U~PH, that ~ub~equent to the filing of her application~ and prior to ~larch 28, 1962, the defendant Land
Hoard sought an opinion frotn the Attorney General of
tlu· ~tate of Utah as to whether or not it could legally
grunt a lt'use to plaintiff pursuant to her applications,
and that on ~larch 28, 1962, the Attorney General advis(ld the Land Board that there was no partial assignIIH'nt of the prior lease on record, that the primary lease
had Pxpired, and that there was no legal bar to the
i~~uaneP of a lease to plaintiff pursuant to her appli-

cations.
Plaintiff again alleges the mandatory requirement
upon the State Land Board to issue leases to the first
qualified applicant and alleges its failure to follow such
n1andate, and further alleges that such failure is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unlawful, in excess of
its jurisdiction, and a willful failure to carry out the
duties imposed upon it by law.
In her third cause of action, plaintiff incorporates
the pertinent paragraphs of her first and second causes
of a<~t ion and alleges that certain of the defendants therein nruned claim an interest in the subject property by
reason of a purported partial assignment which was not
ntade during the primary term of the lease under which
~aid defendants claim, or any extension thereof, and
plaintiff alleges that said assignment is null and void
and the defendants claiming thereunder have no interest
in the property involved.
The fourth cause of action alleges that the land
involved was committed to a unit agreement in June of
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1962 subsequent to plaintiff's filing and alleges that the
balance of the defendants in the action claim an interest
by reason of said unit agreement, and plaintiff further
alleges that all of said interests so claimed are null and
void.
The j udgn1ent of the lo\ver Court dismissing plaintiff's an1ended complaint, applies only to defendants Gulf
Oil Corporation, Southern Natural Gas Company, Sinclair Oil & Gas Con1pany, J. l\Iurray Ruby, aka James
i\L Ruby, Glenna Ruby, Glen l\I. Ruby, Helen Ruby, Utah
State Land Board, and its respPetive members. All other
defendants have ans,vered the a1nended co1nplaint or
appropriate defaults have been taken.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

·The defendants and respondents who are parties to
this appeal have, during the course of the motions presented to the lo,ver Court, raised a great number of
objections to plaintiff's original complaint and her
a1nended cornplaint. The Court, in none of its orders,
indicated the grounds upon \vhich dismissal was ordered
until the order of September 5, "~hen at the request of
plaintiff's counsel, the Court gave as its grounds for
dis1nissal ''that said amended complaint fails to state a
clairn upon \Vhich relief can be granted and on the further
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grounds that tlH' Court is without jurisdiction of the
~ubjl~et tnatter therPin eontained." (R. 219)
It i~ intPrtlsting to note that in their attack against
plaintiff's original complaint, defendants cited several
FPderal eases, runong them, Haley ,r~. Seaton, 281 Fed.
:!d 620 (D. C. Cir. 1960), to the effect that under Federal
law, the ~l'<~retary of the IntPrior need not issue a lease
to the first qualified applicant if he has made a determination that tla· land shall not be available to lease by
anyone. (R. 72, 92) In fact, the Attorney General, in one
of his briPfs presented to the lower Court, stated:

HIt 1nay \veil be that if the Land Board had
made a determination that the subject lands were
available for leasing to the public at large, the
plaintiff may have a claim for relief if preference
\\·PrP giYen to another applicant over the plaintiff,
... '' (R. 93)
:\nd again he stated :

"There is no allegation to the effect that the
State Land Board in any 'vay determined that the
~nbject lands were open to the public at large for
leasing." (R. 92)

.And again:
··J t is submitted that 'vhat the Legislature had
in mind \Vas that 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953 gave the
~and Board 'discretion' whether to accePt applications or not to accept applications to lease land
as they determine the interests of the State and
continuity and fair development of the State's
mineral resources 'varrant. Having detennined
to lease or accept applications, it would then be
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required to accept applications in the order for
which leases are applied. This would 1nean that
there would be no vested right merely upon filing
an application, but a right would not accrue until
the Land Board determined that it was in the best
interests of the State to lease the land in question." (R. 79) (Emphasis Added)

The allegation that such a deterrnination has been
1nade is found in plaintiff's amended complaint in each of
the four causes of action. See paragraph 8 (R. 125).
Plaintiff has alleged that at the time of filing her
application, there was no lease covering the subject property and that it was open to leasing by the public and
that plaintiff was a duly qualified applicant possessing
all of the qualifications required by statute and by the
Rules and Regulations of the Land Board, and that she
\Vas the first such qualified applicant to file upon this
open land. She further alleges that the Land Board had
1nade its determination that the land be available to
leasing by the public. She alleges that, as a matter of
law, the Land Board is under an absolute duty to issue
a lease to such first qualified applicant pursuant to the
provisions of 65-1-88, U.C.A., 19·53, which provides in
part:
"Except as otherwise provided by Section
65-1-45 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by
this act, oil and gas leases in units not exceeding
640 acres or one section, whichever is larger, shall
be issued to the applicant first applying for the
lease "rho is qualified to hold a lease under this
act. . . ." (Emphasis added)
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:-;P<·tion 65-1-45 tnentioned in the preePding section is
not applicable to the fact situation here presented inasnntch as that section specifically refers to the procedure
to ht• followed in the PYPnt a previous tnineral lease is
ca net' /led or otherwise te-r-rni nated and does not apply to
a ~ituntion "'here a prior lease has expired as is the case
hPI"t'.

[n thP recent caHP of Baur vs. Pacific Finance Corporation (July 1963) 14 lTtah 2d 283, 383 p·. 2d 397, this
Court in revl•rsing the lower Court's order dismissing a
co1nplaint stated:
HAs 've have heretofore declared, the granting of a motion to dismiss, which deprives the
party of the privilege of presenting his evidence,
is a harsh measure 'vhich Courts should grant
only 'vhen it clearly appears that taking the view
tnost favorable to the complaint and any facts
'vhich n1ight properly be proved thereunder, no
right to redress could be established; and unless
it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved
in favor of allo,ving him the opportunity to present his proof.~'
St.•P also Sa nuns rs. Eccles, 11 lTtah 2d 289, 358 P. 2d 344.

Plaintiff submits that defendants have at no time
during this proceeding raised any objection to the
amended complaint which could sustain the Court's order
of dismissal. They have, ho,vever, on occasion raised the
question of sovereign immunity regarding the Land
Board, that the Land Board has discretion to issue a
lease to any applicant under Section 65-1-88, and that
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1nandan1us is not the proper remedy in this situation.
These three points \vill be treated separately.
Point 2.

THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 65-1-88, U. C. A., 1953
IS MANDATORY

Respondents contend that the Land Board has discretion whether or not to issue a lease to plaintiff under
the circumstances alleged in her complaint. To support
that contention, they cite Section 65-1-14, U.C.A., 1953
which section covers the general powers of the Land
Board. That section is not applicable to the specific fact
situation here presented.
That specific provisions of a statute take preference
over general statutory provisions is an ele1nentary rule
of statutory construction. See B atentan vs. Board of
Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381, and Pacific
Intermountain Express Co. vs. State Tax Commission,
7 l~ tah 2d 15, 316 P. 2d 549. That rule must prevail here.
\\..-e cannot look to the language conferring the general
powers upon the board in Section 65-1-14 but must look
to the specific statute conferring power upon the board
to issue oil and gas leases. Section 65-1-88, lT.C.A., 1953,
provides that oil and gas leases shall be issued to the
first qualified applicant applying therefore. Plaintiff
has alleged that she is a qualified applicant, that the
land 'vas open for lease at the ti1ne her application was
filed, and that the Land Board had deter1nined to make
the land available to the public for such leasing. These
allegations, of course, must be treated as fact.
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Thi~ Court, in the case of Deseret Savings Bank vs.
Francis, 62 l ~tah S5, 217 P. 1114, held that the use of the
word "shall'' in a statute imposes a mandatory duty.

'rhP Court there stated:
··'rhl' words of the statute are imperative and
n1andatory, and while the mere form of a statute
d<H ,~ not control in this respect the presumption
i~ that the \vords are used in their ordinary sense,
and if a different interpretation is sought it must
rest upon so1nething in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different Ineaning."

Thi8 Court, in that case, 'vent even further and stated
that when a po,ver is given by statute to public officers,
in perini~siy·e language, the language used will be regarded as pere1nptory where the public interest or individual rights require such a construction. See also State
rs. Zehner, 1.0 c·tah 2d 45, 347 P. 2d 111.
There is nothing whatever in the purpose or policy
of the legislation under consideration which would rettuire a different construction. The po,ver given the Land
Boa.rd is not for its benefit but for the benefit of the
public. The Legislature ha~ carefully prescribed the
ttualifications 'vhich an applicant must possess in order
to fall within the class of qualified applicants. See Section 65-1-87. litah Code Annotated, 1953. To construe the
\Vor, l ·•shall'' as giving the Land Board a discretionary
po\ver rather than prescribing a n1andatory duty, would
not only ignore the plain language or the statute but
'vould completely thwart the purpose of the legislation
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and would enable the Land Board to select at rando1n
whichever applicant it might favor at the moment and
discriininate against all others. \r e sub1nit that had the
Legislature atte1npted to give such a discretionary power,
it \vould have been an unconstitutional delegation.
The Land Board, itself, has so construed its obligation as far as the issuance of oil and gas leases are concerned. Section 65-1-97, U.C.A., 1953, gives the Land
Board the power to make and enforce Rules and Regulations not inconsistent with statutory provisions. Pursuant to that authority the Land Board has historically
issued Rules and Regulations governing the issuance of
Inineral leases including oil and gas lea:se:s. The official
Rules and Regulations in effect at the tune plaintiff filed
her application, as they 'vere an1ended on January 10,
196·2, provided:
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules
and Regulations, the land board shall grant a
lease to a qualified applicant whose application is
first filed provided that the rental and the royalty
offered is acceptable to the board." (Rule 2(a)
(6) (b)) (Emphasis added)
Those rules further provide that Section 65-1-45
covering simultaneous filing on newly acquired lands or
those on "~hieh a previous mineral lease has been cancelled or other\\rise terininated, do not apply to lands
covered by oil and gas leases \Yhich expire. Rule 7 (d)
provides:
~'Lands covered by oil and gas leases which

Pxpire are not subject· to the posting of notice or
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to the period for simultaneous filing specified. in
Rule 7 (a). S1tch lands shall be opened t.o le.astng
by tltc first qualifed applicant u_pon exptratton of
the existing lease, .•. " (Emphasis added)
Thus it is seen that the Land Board, by its own rules,
i~~ued pursuant to statutory authority, has reiterated the
ntnndate i1nposed upon it by the Legislature.
'.l'he Land Board has wrongfully refused to follow
thP legi~lative tnandate, and such refusal is, as alleged
in plaintiff's complaint, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unla,vful, in excess of its jurisdiction and a violation of its duty as imposed by law.
Point 3.

THE LOWER COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION

Respondents apparently rely upon the recent case of
JlcKnight l'S. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.
:2d 7:!ti, for the proposition that certiorari is the exclusivt' ren1edy available to plaintiff. That case does not so
hold. It is true that this Court took jurisdiction to review
the findings of the Land Board based upon its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari as conferred by
the Constitution, statute, and the Utah Rules of 'Civil
Procedure. However, the fact that the S·upreme Court
can rPview·, by writ of certiorari, a decision of the Land
Board given pursuant to a formal hearing does not preelude the remedy of mandamus as sought by plaintiff in
this case.
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We have no quarrel with the general rule that an
action in the nature of mandamus will not lie if another
remedy exists which is plain, speedy, complete and fully
adequate. However, the fact that this Court has entertained a controversy from the ~Land Board under its
original jurisdiction to issue 'vrits of certiorari, does not
mean that certiorari affords a plain, adequate, and
speedy remedy to this plaintiff or that it is even available
to her under the circumstances of this case. In discussing
the type of remedy which would preclude the availability
of mandamus, the following language in 34 Am. Jur.,
Mandamus, Section 44 is pertinent:
"It cannot be said to be fully adequate unless
it is commensurate with the necessities and rights
of the complaining party, under all the circumstances of the case, reaches the end intended, and
actually compels performance of the duty in question. Furthermore, the remedy which will preclude mandamus must be equally as convenient,
complete, beneficial, and effective as would be
mandamus, and be sufficiently speedy to prevent
n1aterial injury. Another remedy, tedious and not
so well adapted to the nature of the case as that
by mandamus, will not operate to prevent resort
to the latter remedy.'' (Emphasis Added)
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred upon the
District 'Court by the Constitution and by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not ex-
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cepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by
law;

• • •

urrhP District Courts or any judge ,thereof
shall have power to issue writs of habeas c?rpu~,
1na ndamus, injunction, quo warranto, cert~orar~,
prohib1•t•1on ... "
Rule 65B(b) (3) likewise confers jurisdiction upon
the District Court.
Actually, plaintiff has no other remedy whatever.
A hearing befor(:l the Land Board would he futile inastnuch as the Land Board is powerless to adjudicate the
rights of the n1any defendants claiming an interest in the
subject property adverse to plaintiff.
In the case of State vs. Walker (New Mexico, 1956)
:.!9:! P. :!d 329, the Supreme ,Court of New Mexico con~idered a case virtually identical with the case being here
con8idered. The plaintiff in that case tendered certain
lodP tnining location notices to the New Mexico Commis~ionPr of Publie Land. The Commissioner failed to issue
hint a pPrtnit in accordance with the mandate of the statute and hP brought a mandamus proceeding in the Distrirt Court. The trial court quashed the alternative writ
on the single ground that the Commissioner was an
tlXecuti YP officer exercising a discretionary function and,
therefore, the Court was without jurisdiction and without authority to grant the requested relief.
The pertinent portion of the New Mexico Statute
(Section 7-9-4, 1953 Compilation) provided that:
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"Upon filing of such copy, the commissioners
shall issue a permit to the locator granting him
the exclusive right to prospect for ores or metals
within the limits of said location ... " (Emphasis
Added)
The S·upreme Court, in reversing the trial court,
stated:
"It is established la'v that the purpose of
1nandamus is to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty which one charged with its performance has refused to perform.
"While mandamus will not lie to correct or
control the judgment or discretion of a public
officer in matters cormnitted to his care in the
ordinary discharge of his duties, it is nevertheless well established that mandamus will lie to
compel the performance of mere ministerial acts
or duties imposed by law upon a public officer to
do a particular act or thing upon the existence of
certain facts or conditions being shown, even
though the officer be required but to exercise
judgment before acting, (citing cases). A ministerial act, as applied to a public officer, is an act
or thing which he is required to perform by direction of law upon a given state of facts being shown
to exist, regardless of his own opinion as to the
propriety or impropriety of doing the act in a
particular case . . .
,. In accordance with the letter and spirit of
Section '7 -9-4 supra, the respondent is bound _to
perform his duty in respect to accepting lode mining location notice tendered to him by locators,
who have complied with the terms of the statute,
for filing in his office,
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• • •
··t n the

ea~e

at bar the respondent was tenderPd eopiP~ of lode mining locatio~! notices by
thP rPlator which clearly and unequivocally met
all n~quireTnents of the statute, and ~he accepting
of thP satne for filing in the land off1ce was rnandatory and unqualified.

• • •
"ThPrefore, upon formal tender of lode mining location notices being made, it wast~~ duty of
the rospondent to accPpt the same for f1hng purpos('~, for thP statute simply imposes upon the
respondent a tninistPrial duty in \vhich he had no
discretion.
··As our conclusion is that the judgment of
the trial court must be reversed, it becomes unne::;sary to detertnnie the remaining questions presentPd in this appeal."
In the case of Hta.tc vs. State Highway Patrol (Montana, 195~) ~t~l P. ~cl 612, the l\iontana Supreme Court
hPld that the 1nere existence of a right of appeal where
it i~ inadequate does not preclude the issuance of a writ
of n1andate. Of course, in the case at bar, there is no
right of appeal from the absolute failure of respondent
Land Board to issue a lease in accordance with the statutory ntandate. Plaintiff has no remedy other than the
one she seeks here.

In Koehn t·s. State Board of Equalization, et al,
(California, 1958) 333 P. 2d 125, the Court held that
mandrunus ·w·as a proper remedy to test the action of
the state alcoholic beverage control board even though
certiorari was also available. The Court there stated:
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·'Appellant then contends that the only review of the Appeals Board's action can be by
certiorari to the District Court of Appeal. It
points to section 4b, article \'I, Constitution
'vhich states that the District Court of Appeal
may exercise appellate jurisdiction "in proceedings of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition • • •
and in such other special proceedings as may be
provided by law * * * '. (Emphasis added.) It
then argues that the Legislature, in designating
as the powers of the Appeals Board, the appellate
review provisions of section 1094.5, Code of Civil
Procedure (writ of mandamus) applicable to constitutional agencies (compare section 23084, Business and Professions Code with section 1094.5,
Code of Civil Procedure as to constitutional
agencies) intended by implication that the review
provided for in section 23091, Business and Professions Code ('Final orders of the board shall
be subject to judicial revie'v as prescribed by
law') would fall within the above quoted provision of the Constitution giving the District
Court of Appeal original jurisdiction in 'such
other special proceedings as may be provided by
law • * *'. Such an interpretation of 'judicial
review as prescribed by law' is too narrow.
'[L] aw' refers to section 1094.5, Code of ·Civil
Procedure (mandamus) and sections 1067-1077,
Code of Civil Procedure (certiorari). Both the
District ·Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court
have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus
and certiorari. In the instances where the sole
jurisdiction of certiorari from the acts of an
administrative agency is in the appellate courts
such exclusive jurisdiction and the necessary procedure has been set forth by the Legislature.
Thus sections 1756 and 1759 of the Public Utilities
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CodP, providing ePrtio rari frotn the act~ o~ t~e
Publir lTtili tiPs Cotnmission, has placed JUrisdiction PxelusivPly in the Supre1ne Court, and Labor
Codt•, ~Prtion 5950 providing certiorari from the
acts of the Industrial Accident Commission has
placed jurisdietion exclusively in the District
ourts of 1\ppeal. If, in connection with acts of
thP Appeals Board, the Legislature intended that
<'Prt iorari should be the Pxclusive procedure and
t hut the District Courts of Appeal should have
Pxrlusivt· jurisdiction, it is reasonable to assume
that tht' J~egislature \\rould have said so, as it did
in thP Jlublic Utilities Commission and Industrial
.\eeident ( 0lntnission rnatters.''
1

(

1

That situation is IH'PeisPly the one here presented.
The LPgislaturP ha~ 1nade no provision whatever in
Title 65 dealing "·ith stat<· lands for a specific method
of tPsting the validity of the Land Board's acts or
otnission~. Cotnpare that \vith Section 54-7-16 U.'C.A.,
l953, \\·hieh sets forth in detail the procedure by which
orders of the Public ~Prvice Corn1nission may be tested.
Tlu~ language of the Koehn case is applicable here had the Legislature intended that certiorari be the exclusivP rPIUPdy as they obviously did in the Public Utilities .A.et. it i8 reasonable to assun1e that it would have
~n provided.
The Legislature has directed the Land Board in
peretnptory and 1nandatory language to perform the
tnini~terial act of is~uing a lease to the plaintiff under
the conditions alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Such failure is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unlawful, in
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excess of its jurisdiction, and a violation of its duty as
imposed by law. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate,
or speedy remedy and indeed has no other remedy at all
other than the one being here pursued which can fully
adjudicate her rights and the rights of the parties adversely claiming against her. Clearly the District Court
does have jurisdiction of this case.

Point 4.
THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS NOT
AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS

All of the respondents involved in this appeal have
urged the defense of sovereign immunity. It is clear
that such a defense, if it did exist, would be available
only to the State Land Board. See Decorso vs. Thomas,
89 Utah 160, 50 P. 2d 9'51, wherein the Court stated:
"Suffice it to observe that the defense that
the state land board may not be sued without its
consent is for its benefit and protection, and such
defense is not available to defendant Mohlman."
This, again, points up the fact that no tribunal,
other than a court of general jurisdiction, can adequately
adjudicate the rights of the 1nany parties involved in this
proceeding.
We respectfully submit that the defense of sovereign
immunity is not available to the State Land Board in
this action. S·ee 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, Section 123
wherein it is stated:
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"If the tnandamus proceeding in which the

Htate's officers or boards are made respondents
cannot subject the state to the payment of money
or result in any diminution of its sovereignty,
it is not a proce.eding against the state, as where
all that can possibly flow from the judgment
in numdatnus is that the public official or official board \vill be required to refund or release
1noncy or property wrongfully detained from the
relator."
Rt~spondents

have cited the case of Wilkinson vs.
State, l't al, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 in support of their
defense of sovereign im1nunity. That case is one seeking
to rt~cover da,mages to plaintiff's land and crops allegedly
caused by the acts of the Land Board. The Court, in
that case, held, and properly so, that the state is imtnunl~ from a claim for damages unless expressed perntission is given by statute or Constitution. The ·Court
did, ho\vever, clearly indicate that its ruling did not
apply to actions in the nature of mandamus by the
following language:
"By what we have said we do not mean that
state officers, or state boards, or state agencies
may not, under certain circumstances, be sued
in the courts. Such cases abound in the reports
of this as well as other states."
In the case of Thoreson vs. State Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 57 P. 175, the Court held that where a
~tatute requires an officer to perform a ministerial act,
he will not be permitted, in a mandamus proceeding, to
plead, in justification of non-performance, that the act
would violate the constitution.
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In the case of State vs. Cutler, 34 lT tah 99, 95 P.
1071, the Court considered a claim by a court reporter
against the Board of Exanriners for nrileage. The plaintiff, in that case, proceeded by way of rnandarnus, and
the Board of Examiners raised the defense of sovereign
immunity. 'This Court there stated:
"It is further urged that a writ of mandate
should not issue against respondents for the reason that in passing upon claims against the state
they act in a quasi judicial capacity and must
therefore be permitted to exercise the discretion
usually exercised by such boards. That respondents do act in such a capacity, and that they may
exercise discretionary powers in the discharge of
their official duties in passing upon and in allowing or rejecting claims, does not admit of doubt.
But this discretion is not one that may be arbitrarily exercised so as to prevent claimant from
seeking redress in the courts where purely questions of law are involved. In such cases even
courts may be compelled to proceed to judgment,
and, where the law directs what the judgment
shall be in case all the facts are found or admitted, a superior court may direct an inferior
one with respect to the particular judgment that
shall be entered by it. The povv~er to do this is
not limited to appellate proceedings, as is illustrated in the case of State v. ~!l:orse, 31 Utah 213,
87 Pac. 705.
"In vie\v of the conceded facts, there is nothing upon which the respondents can legally exercise any discretionary powers in this case, and
therefore they should have audited and allowed
the claim.
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·~Thore

would be so1nething lacking in our
system of government or jurisprudence if under
such circumstances a claimant could be defeated
simply because the officer or board requir~d to
audit and allow his claiin exercised some discretion in the matter. Where the duty to act is clear,
nnd the Ia\\" gives a right to obtain payment of
a <'laiin o\\·ing hy the state, courts should not
hP~itate to enforce the right by mandamus."

In thl' Parly case of Whit-rnore vs. Candland, 1915,
-1-7 LTtah 7'7, 1!>1 1). 528, this Court held:

···The whole matter of making disposition of
the state's land was placed in the hands and
under the control of the state land board. No
right of appeal to the courts, or of reviewing
the board's actions otherwise by the courts, except where lack or excess of power is alleged,
has been given." (Emphasis added.)
The corollary of this rule, of course, is that if the
board has acted \vithout or in excess of its powers or
jurisdiction, a court may inquire into such action. Such
allegations art' clearly made in each cause of action of
plaintiff's con1plaint.
In the case of Decorso vs. Thomas, supra, the State
Land Board urged the defense of sovereign immunity
claiming that it could not be sued without its consent.
This Court, after referring to the case of Wilkinson vs.
State, supra, (an action for money damages against the
~tate) and to the case of Whitmore vs. Candland supra
'
,
("·herein the Court held that the Land Board could be
sued if it acts \vithout or in excess of its power or
jurisdiction), stated:
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"When the commissioners of the state land
board attempted to cancel the lease because of
the failure to pay royalties, without giving the
statutory notice, their action in such respect is
contrary to law and in excess of their powers
and a nullity with respect to the interests of
the copartnership."
We submit that this Court has consistently held
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available
to an agency of the state where no money damages are
sought and where the inquiry is to determine whether
such agency has acted without or in excess of its powers
or jurisdiction.

Plaintiff has clearly stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted. She has alleged a right on her
part given by statute (65-1-88). She has alleged an absolute and mandatory duty on the part of the defendant
Land Board to perform the ministerial act of issuing
a lease to her on lands which it had determined were
open to lease to the public. She has alleged that the
failure of the Land Board to issue a lease under these
conditions was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unlawful, and in excess of its jurisdiction, and a willful
failure to carry out its duties as imposed by law. For
the purpose of this appeal, those allegations must be
treated as uncontroverted facts. Plaintiff is clearly enti tied to have the District Court review the actions of
the Land Board to determine whether or not it acted
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lawfully and within its jurisdiction or unlawfully and
in PX('t':-\~ ot' its jurisdiction. There is no la'v to the
t~ontrary.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the District Court by
thtt Constitution, by the Utah cases, and by the Utah
Rult-~ of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff has no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy to con1pel issuance of a lease to her or to have
an adjudication of the conflicting claims of the numerous
dt~fendants.

Plaintiff has complied with all statutory requiretuents and all requiren1ents of the Rules and Regulations
of the Land Board, itself. ·The Land Board, pursuant
to the statutory mandate and pursuant to its own Rules
and Regulations, has nothing left to do but perform
tlw tninisterial act of issuing a lease to her. Upon its
failure to do so, the District Court can compel the Board
to take such action.
Respondents' position runounts to the proposition,
noh,·ithstanding the mandatory language of the statute
and the Rules and Regulations of the Land Board itself
'
'
that the Board Inay issue a lease to whomever it pleases,
'vhenever it pleases, and under any circumstances which
\vould satisfy its caprice. Furthermore, such acts or
otni~~ion~, according to respondents' theory, would be
forever shielded from judicial scrutiny by the cloak of
sovereign immunity. There is no support in conscience,
la'v or equity for such position.
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Plaintiff respectfully submits that the District Court
erred in dismissing her complaint with prejudice and
prays that this honorable Court reverse such order and
remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

MARK K. BOYLE
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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